Volume 2, Issue 1, No.2 PDF DOWNLOAD
  • Title:
  • Emp protection - unsolved seventy-year-old problem: contradictions, incompetence, or premeditation?
  • Author:

    Vladimir Gurevich

  • Author Affiliation:

    Central Electrical Laboratory, Israel Electric Corp., Haifa, Israel

  • Received:May.20, 2023
  • Accepted:Jun.6, 2023
  • Published:Jun.20, 2023
Abstract

Since the devastating effect of HEMP on electronics in the military field has been known for a long time, all military systems are equipped with efficient protection against the impact of HEMP. However, HEMP is equally dangerous for all civil electronics used in almost every section of today's most important infrastructure of any country, for instance the power industry. Therefore, the opinion that all technical problems have long been solved by the military and you just need to use their solutions and their experience in the civilian sector can be heard often. It is a very common and very dangerous illusion in the author opinion. The article describes the problems associated with the use of military technology in the civilian sector, as well as numerous fakes from the world's leading research centers, reporting that they have solved all the problems of protecting infrastructure. The article proposes an author’s strategy for protecting the civilian infrastructure based on its own researches and developments. 

Keywords

EMP, HEMP, nuclear electromagnetic pulse, electrical grid protection, critical infrastructure, protection strategy, civilian electrical equipment. 

References

[1] Gurevich V. Protecting Electrical Equipment: GOOD Practices for Preventing High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse Impacts. Berlin. DeGruyter, 2019

[2] Protecting America’s Electric Grid Against Electromagnetic Pulse Attack. Report of Foundation for Resilient Societies, 2017.

[3] Baker G. Testimony of Dr. George H. Baker before the Senate Homeland Security Committee, 2019. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, February 27, 2019.

[4] Cooper H. Will Biden Improve Trump’s Cyber and EMP Initiatives? – NewsMax, 29 January 2021.

[5] Yates L., Gunning B. P., Crawford M.H., at al. Demonstration of >6.0-kV Breakdown Voltage in Large Area Vertical GaN p-n 

Diodes with Step-Etched Junction Termination Extensions. - IEEE Transactions on Electron Devices, Vol. 69, No. 4, 2022, pp. 1931 – 1937.

[6] TVS/Zener Theory and Design Considerations. Handbook, 2005, On Semiconductor. 17

[7] Riley K. EPRI report says existing tech would protect U.S. grid against electromagnetic pulses. – Daily Energy Insider, April 30, 2019 (https://dailyenergyinsider.com/featured/19089-epri-report-says-existing-tech-would-protect-u-s-grid-againstelectromagnetic-pulses/).

[8] Cash C. Report: Electromagnetic Pulse Would Not Have Widespread Impact on Electric Grid. NRECA (America's Electric Cooperatives), April 30, 2019 (https://www.electric.coop/report-electromagnetic-pulse-would-not-have-widespread-impact-onelectric-grid )

[9] Walter J. Scientists Are Zapping Fake Electrical Grids to Help Us Survive an EMP Attack. – Discover Magazine, August 8, 2019 (https://www.discovermagazine.com/environment/scientists-are-zapping-fake-electrical-grids-to-help-us-survive-an-emp).

[10] Niiler E. The Grid Might Survive an Electromagnetic Pulse Just Fine. – Wired, April 30, 2019 (https://www.wired.com/story/the-grid-might-survive-an-electromagnetic-pulse-just-fine/)

[11] Electromagnetic Pulse Shielding Mitigations. Best Practices for Protection of Mission Critical Equipment. - Report of DHSScience and Technology Directorate, August 2022.

[12] Vasaka C. S. Technical Note NADC-EL-N5507: Problems in Shielding Electrical and Electronic Equipments. Naval Air Development Center, Johnsville, June 1955.

[13] MIL-STD-285. Attenuation measurement for enclosures, electromagnetic shielding, for electronic test purposes, method of. US Department of Defense, 15 June 1956.

[14] Lasitter H. A. Technical Report R-454: Construction and Evaluation of a Prototype Electromagnetically Shielded Room, Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory, Port Hueneme, June 1966.

[15] Lasitter H. A., Clark D. B. Technical Note N-962: Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse Effects Design Parameters for Protective Shelters, Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory, Port Hueneme, June 1968.

[16] MIL-STD-907B. Engineering and design criteria for shelters. Expandable and non-expandable. US Department of Defense, 9 September 1985.

[17] MIL-STD-188-125. High-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) protection for ground-based C4I facilities performing critical, time-urgent missions. US Department of Defense, 16 June 1990.

[18] Report AD-A275 335. EMP Design and Test Guidelines for Systems in Mobile Shelters. Army Research Laboratory, ARL-SR-1, December 1993.

[19] Gurevich V. Protecting Electrical Equipment: NEW Practices for Preventing High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse Impacts. Berlin. DeGruyter, 2021. 

[20] Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Protection and Resilience Guidelines for Critical Infrastructure and Equipment. National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, Arlington, Virginia, 2019.

[21] Kukjoo K. at al. Development of Decision-Making Factors to Determine EMP Protection Level: A Case Study of a Brigade-Level EMP Protection Facility. -Applied Science, 2021, No. 11, 2921. MDPI.

[22] Technical Report LLNL-TR-741344, Lawrence Livermore national Laboratory, 2017.

[23] MIL-STD-2169B. High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Environmental. Department of Defense, 2012. 

[24] Pry V. Russia: EMP Threat. The Russian Federation’s Military Doctrine, Plans, and Capabilities for Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack. EMP Task Force on National and Homeland Security, 2021.

[25] Cui M. Numerical Simulation of the HEMP Environmental. - IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility, 2013, Vol. 55, No. 3.

[26] Smith K., at al. Numerical Fits for Estimating High-Altitude EMP from Unclassified Gamma Ray Pulse Sources. MetatechTechnical Note, 1990.

[27] IEC 61000-4-25. Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) Part 4-25: Testing and measurement techniques – HEMP immunity test methods for equipment and systems, 2002.

[28] Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP): Thread to Critical Infrastructure. - Hearing before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity.Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies of the Committee on Homeland Security. One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, second session, May 8, 2014, No. 113-68.

[29] Apostolov A. The digital transformation. - Protection, Automation & Control World (PAC World), September 2022, p.4.

[30] Apostolov A. Not IF but WHEN. From the editor. - Protection, Automation & Control World (PAC World), December 2021, p. 4.

[31] The Digital Substations Market Growth. Last word. - Protection, Automation & Control World (PAC World), December 2021, p. 98.

[32] Strategy for Protecting the Homeland Against Threats of Electromagnetic Pulse and Geomagnetic Disturbances, United States Department of Homeland Security, 2018.

[33] Durkovich C. Testimony of Caitlin Durkovich submitted to the Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee. Hearing: To Examine the Threat Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse and Policy Options to Protect Energy Infrastructure, May 4, 2017.

[34] Wailes K. Statement of Kevin Wailes submitted to the Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee. Hearing: To Examine the Threat Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse and Policy Options to Protect Energy Infrastructure, May 4, 2017.

[35] Manning R. E. Statement of Robin E. Manning submitted to the Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee. Hearing: To Examine the Threat Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse and Policy Options to Protect Energy Infrastructure, May 4, 2017.

[36] Gabbard B., Joseph R. Addressing Electromagnetic Threats to U.S. Critical Infrastructure. - JINSA’s Gemunder Center EMP Task Force, JINSA, September 2015.

Copyright 2018 - 2023 Sanderman Publishing House